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1.  INTRODUCTION 
As a massive global phenomenon, mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) are complex economic, 
political, and social events with fundamental 
stakeholder management implications. Global 
M&A volume has been valued at slightly over 
the US$4 trillion for each of the past two years.1 
M&As have dramatic and disruptive consequences 
on a firm’s organisational life;2 growth strategy;3 
strategic renewal;4 forms of change;5 and ability 
to meet market challenges.6 Various stakeholder 
group relationships (referred to as stakeholder 
relationships in this paper) are affected by and affect 
M&As in different ways, often complementing, 
often conflicting. 
Extending the context of M&A research to its 
stakeholder relationships helps broaden our 
understanding of the complexities, opportunities, 
and obstacles that surround M&As.7 Meglio 
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and Risberg8 argue that ‘M&As are fraught 
with instabilities, ambiguities, politicisation, and 
fragmentation that traditional research approaches 
cannot do justice to’. Therefore, M&As can take 
place in the context of incidents, activities, and 
actions that continually unfold with implications 
for various stakeholders.9 The numbers-logic 
tradition in corporate planning cannot suggest 
stakeholder reactions to a significant organisational 
transition, such as an M&A.10 Yet the context of 
the M&A process, and the surrounding stakeholder 
relationships, are too often researched and 
managed in isolation. In this paper, I connect 
stakeholder research with M&A research.
From a previous analysis11 we found that research 
linking stakeholders and M&A research is 
fragmented and divergent. Although more and 
more varied stakeholders are increasingly being 
investigated through a diverse range of analytic 
approaches, research methods, and disciplines, 
the analyses in these studies are still unidirectional 
examinations of how M&As affect stakeholders, not 
how stakeholders affect M&As. They also fall short 
of investigating inter- and intra-group stakeholder 
relationships. Thus, we have gained little insight into 
the complex web of stakeholder relationships during 
an M&A process. Against such shortcomings, there 
remains a need to analyse context and relationships 
concurrently to understand how stakeholder 
relationships around a merger process are managed. 
I have undertaken this analysis task through a case 
study on the AU$11 billion mega-merger process 
between the Australian gaming groups Tatts Group 
Ltd (Tatts) and Tabcorp Holdings Ltd (Tabcorp) 
over 2016/17. (Note that, hereafter, all currency  
is in AUD unless specified otherwise).
The research question addressed in this paper  
is: How was Tatts and Tabcorp’s stakeholder 
management affected by, and how did it affect its 
merger process? I examine documents and use 
interview evidence from the case merger. I identify 
several key stakeholder relationships in this merger 
process that were disrupted and disruptive to offer 
insights into how this complex web of relationships 
was managed.
I draw on Heidegger’s philosophy of hermeneutics12 
to make theoretical sense of the relationships 
between stakeholders and the M&A process.13  
In Heideggerian terms, relationships refer to  
ways of assembling the parts of a phenomenon:  
a contextual phenomenon in which the parts  
are related to each other.14 Each stakeholder 
relationship is constructed through their relationship 
with different stakeholders, as well as to the  
whole (merger process). Gadamer 15 explains:  
‘It is a circular relationship .. . The anticipation of 
meaning in which the whole is envisaged becomes 
explicit understanding in that the parts, determined 
by the whole, themselves also determine this 
whole’. I find that managing stakeholder group 
relationships during the Tatts/Tabcorp merger 
process involved both balancing and disempowering 
key stakeholder groups. 
With this analysis, I connect two research fields 
– stakeholders and M&As – helping to solve 
complex problems around managing stakeholder 
relationships during an M&A process. Viewing 
M&A processes in the context of fluid and dynamic 
relationships allows us to identify those relationships 
explicitly. The originality of this research lies in 
accommodating the complexity of M&A processes, 
JOURNAL OF BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS, VOLUME 2, NUMBER 1, 2020 39
SEGAL, MANAGING STAKEHOLDER RELATIONSHIPS DURING TATTS/TABCORP MERGER PROCESS




20. Sachs, 2015, p. 4
21. Stiglitz, 2019
22. Segal, Guthrie and Dumay, 2020
23. Bettinazzi and Zollo, 2014
24. Segal, Guthrie and Dumay, 2020
25. Barone, Ranamagar and Solomon, 2013; Borglund, 2012; Deng, Kang and Low, 2013; Dorata, 2012; Waddock and Graves, 2006
26. Lamberg et al., 2008; Meglio, King and Risberg, 2015
27. Anderson et al., 2013; Cording, Harrison, Hoskisson and Jonsen, 2013; King and Taylor, 2012; Madhavan, 2005; Martirosyan and Vashakmadze, 2013;  
Meglio et al., 2015
which involve a web of defined stakeholder 
relationships that have to be managed to ensure  
the M&A proceeds.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. 
Section 2 contains a literature review, which  
tracks progress towards a stakeholder perspective 
of M&A analysis leading up to the research question. 
Section 3 outlines the research methods used.  
The Tatts/Tabcorp merger case history is  
provided in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 provide  
an analysis and discussion of the merger process. 
The paper concludes in Section 7 with a summary 
of the evidence and findings in response to the 
research question.
2.  M&As AND THE STAKEHOLDER 
LITERATURE 
This literature review tracks and explores the 
stakeholder perspective of M&A analysis to arrive at 
the research question. Segal, Guthrie and Dumay16 
highlight that well before the first merger wave 
of 1895–1904,17 economists were aware of the 
social, political, and economic consequences of 
market concentration. For instance, Adam Smith18 
saw economic concentration as a distortion of 
the market’s natural ability to allocate society’s 
resources optimally. Karl Marx19 outlined how 
concentrating production in fewer hands can  
only occur with the simultaneous creation of  
its opposite – the poverty and misery of many. 
While early conceptualisations were not specifically 
M&A-focused, they anticipate the broader  
societal consequences of market concentration  
as an outcome of what would evolve into  
corporate M&As. 
These anticipations of the social, political, and 
economic aspects of M&As are consistent with 
contemporary conceptual understandings of a 
more stakeholder-engaged corporate and financial 
world. This is manifested in terminology like ‘socially 
inclusive’ economic growth that is developing 
around the Sustainable Development Goals set 
by the United Nations in 2015 for 2030.20 Stiglitz21 
talks about ‘progressive capitalism’, based on an 
understanding of societal wellbeing in response 
to the ‘neoliberal fantasy’ (e.g., that unfettered 
markets will deliver prosperity to everyone). Yet 
M&A scholars seldom incorporate such conceptual 
understandings into their inquiries despite the 
broad consequences of M&A activities.22 An 
incentive related to M&A as to why business 
leaders are feeling pressure to rethink their 
societal role is research showing an overall positive 
association between an acquirer’s attitudes towards 
stakeholders and acquisition performance.23 
Studies proposing stakeholder analysis in the 
context of M&A research have been undertaken 
from different perspectives,24 including corporate 
responsibility,25 process26 and stakeholder 
frameworks.27 
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A stakeholder approach to M&A analysis also has 
precedent in various case studies, which reflects  
the explanatory power of single-case research  
to M&A analysis. Case studies have researched:  
the suppression of growing tensions between 
shareholders and other stakeholders;28 how initial 
stakeholder relationships largely explain unexpected 
changes;29 the importance of stakeholder briefings 
in negotiating M&As;30 the influence of stakeholder 
concerns;31 the increasing importance of stakeholder 
interests compared to shareholder interests;32 the 
need for greater focus on weaker stakeholders;33 
changes to inter-group dynamics between internal 
and external stakeholders;34 and the failure to 
consider neglected stakes put at risk by an M&A.35 
Merger case studies also reveal stakeholder 
concerns as critical to the failed merger between 
United Airlines and US Airways36 and progressing 
Pernod Ricard’s acquisition of Vin & Sprit.37  
A structured literature review (SLR) by Segal, 
Guthrie, and Dumay38 connecting stakeholders and 
M&A processes shows that few studies have been 
dedicated to examining the relationships between 
stakeholders and M&As, especially prior to the late 
1990s. And, even though M&A research is now 
rapidly expanding to include diverse stakeholders, 
analytic approaches, research methods, disciplines, 
etc., accounting and finance publications are still 
mostly ignoring non-shareholder stakeholders in 
researching M&A. The literature is dominated by 
unidirectional analyses that primarily consider the 
effect M&As have on stakeholders, not the impact 
stakeholders have on M&As. The focus is on the 
close connections between stakeholders and the 
organisation under study, and inter- and intra-group 
relationships between stakeholders are generally 
ignored. Instead, stakeholders are treated as 
homogeneous and, therefore, undifferentiated. 
Thus, research falls short in more explicitly eliciting 
the complex web of relationships between an  
M&A process and the various stakeholders involved. 
Consequently, M&A research does not capture  
the implications of stakeholder management in  
the merger process.
These research gaps lead to the research 
question: How was Tatts and Tabcorp’s stakeholder 
management affected by, and how did it affect, its 
merger process?
3.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:  
A SINGLE CASE STUDY
The case is a single case study method which 
combines a documentary analysis and semi-
structured interview evidence. 
3.1 Single case study
Yin39 notes that ‘the distinctive need for case study 
research arises out of the desire to understand 
complex social phenomena. A case study allows 
investigators to focus on a case and retain a 
holistic and real-world perspective’. He describes 
case studies as a social science methodology that 
can answer ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions about a 
contemporary phenomenon where the researcher 
has little control over behavioural events. I seek to 
understand how Tatts and Tabcorp’s stakeholder 
management was affected by, and affected, its 
merger process.
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The case is the merger between the Australian 
gaming groups Tatts and Tabcorp. Announced on 
19 October 2016, the merger was to combine 
Australia’s two largest gambling groups into a 
diversified gambling entertainment group with  
a pro forma enterprise value of $11.3 billion.  
The analysis covers the period from when the 
merger was announced to its implementation in 
December 2017. This merger is an appropriate  
case to study stakeholder relationships in an  
M&A process because of its economic, political,  
and social significance; its size and complexity;  
the extensive data available from multiple sources 
(documentary and interviews); and the many 
stakeholders it involved. 
3.2 Data collection
The evidence for the case was drawn from 
document analysis and semi-structured interviews. 
The documents provided essential information for 
understanding the events surrounding the case, 
particularly the stakeholder engagement processes.
The interviews provided information to amplify the 
insights arising from the documentary research.40 
Documentation
Given the intense public scrutiny surrounding 
the merger, there was extensive documentary 
material to draw on. The parties released merger 
announcements,41 the agreement,42 an information 
booklet and an independent experts report,43 
as well as annual reports, press releases, and 
shareholder updates. The high profile merger 
also attracted extensive interest from the media, 
brokers, analysts, and proxy advisors, which 
generated further data. Most notably, the decision 
to authorise the merger, which would usually have 
been handed down by the Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission (ACCC), was 
referred to the Australian Competition Tribunal 
(Tribunal), resulting in evidence from 84 witnesses 
and interested third parties. This was supported 
by expert economic and industry evidence 
commissioned by Tatts and Tabcorp.
A list of the documents analysed is given in 
Appendix 1 (see page 64).
Semi-structured interviews
Interviews can provide information to amplify 
insights found from documents.44 However, ‘the 
challenge of interview data,’ note Eisenhardt and 
Graebner,45 ‘is best mitigated by data collection 
approaches that limit bias’. This involves ‘using 
numerous and highly knowledgeable informants 
who view the focal phenomena from diverse 
perspectives’. Therefore, I conducted 32 semi-
structured interviews with key decisionmakers  
in a range of stakeholder organisations, as shown  
in Table 1 (see page 42).
Nearly all of the interviewees had first-hand 
involvement in decision-making during the  
merger process. These included: executives  
(T1, T2); bankers (F1, F2), lawyers (L1–L4); and 
communications advisors (CA1); shareholders  
(S1-S8); racing industry representatives (Rac1, Rac2); 
regulators (R1); competitors (C1–C3); and licensed 
gaming venues (G1). The remaining interviews 
held with experts (E1–E5), an analyst (A1), and 
investment bankers (IB1, IB2).
The interviews were conducted via a 30–60-minute 
phone call and were recorded. They were semi-
structured with a localist approach, defined by 
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Qu and Dumay46 as enhancing understanding of 
the interviews in a social context. This means the 
conversation can be treated as more than a tool 
for collecting data. As new data emerged, some 
interviewees were re-interviewed about the new 
evidence in an iterative process of going back and 
forth. This question-answer interview and response 
pattern built a dynamic narrative of the merger 
process, consistent with a hermeneutic approach  
to building understanding.




Communication advisor CA CA1
Competitor C C1–C3
Expert E E1–E5
Banker F F1, F2
Independent investment 
banker IB IB1, IB2
Lawyer L L1–L4
Licensed gaming venue G G1
Racing industry Rac Rac1, Rac2
Regulator R R1
Shareholder S S1–S8
Executive T T1, T2
Total 32
3.3 Data sorting
The stakeholder relationships involved in the  
Tatts/Tabcorp merger are listed in Table 2.
From the documentary and interview evidence,  
I identified six stakeholder relationships that could 
have disrupted the Tatts/Tabcorp merger process: 
the shareholders (Element A), Pacific Consortium 
(B), the racing industry (C), the regulators (D), 
competitors (E), and advisors (F). Further, some 
of these stakeholder groups comprise relevant 
subgroups, as highlighted in the third column. 
Column 4 shows the group’s initial reaction to the 
merger, followed by their concerns (Column 5), 
their final response to the merger process (Column 
6), and the outcome of the merger process for 
them (Column 7). The last column of Table 2 
draws on the typology of Savage, Nix, Whitehead, 
and Blair47 to examine how the most potentially 
disruptive stakeholder relationships were managed 
during the merger process, which is discussed in 
detail in Section 5.2. Segal, Guthrie and Dumay  
et al.48 apply Mitchell, Agle, and Wood’s49 typology 
of stakeholder salience to identify ‘who or what 
really counts’. However, Savage et al.’s typology50 
was specifically developed to help devise strategies 
for assessing and managing stakeholders, making it 
more appropriate for the stakeholder management 
focus of this paper.
3.4 Data interpretation
Following Creswell,51 this paper is ‘interpretive’ 
where researchers interpret what they see, hear, 
and understand ‘to make sense of (or interpret)  
the meanings others have about the world’.  
I adopted a hermeneutic form of interpreting 
what was read and heard from the literature and 
interview data. This involved seeing the parts of 
phenomena through their relationship with each 
other in a referential whole.52 An interpretative 
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Oppose Less competition for Vic Tab 
licence, anti-competitive 
leveraging through Sky, 
reduced industry funding, 
licence and retail outlet 
arbitrage, export revenue loss














Concern Less attractive for Tabcorp  
to pool with RWWA;  





D Regulators Tribunal Support Merger in public interest Support Allowed 
merger
4
ACCC Concern4 Harm competition in 
Queensland electronic  
gaming machine services




E Competitors CrownBet5 Oppose Reduced competition; reduced 
output; lower growth; leakage 
to offshore betting operators
Support Agreed access 
to Sky racing 
stream
4
Racing.com Oppose Remove rival, more power  
to leverage wagering JVs




F Advisors Support Support Facilitated 
merger
1
1. Savage, Nix, Whitehead, and Blair (1991) typology identifying four different types of stakeholders, shown in Figure 1
2. The Pacific Consortium comprised: First State Superannuation Scheme; Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Inc. as adviser to and manager of  
North Haven Infrastructure Partners IILP; one or more affiliates of Kohlberg Kravis Roberts and Co. L.P.; and Macquarie Corporate Holdings 
3. Joint Tribunal submission by Racing Victoria, Harness Racing Victoria, and Greyhound Racing Victoria
4. The ACCC’s Statement of Issues outlined five further issues that ‘may raise concern’: removal of potential supplier of totalisator; pooling services; 
removal of bidder for totalisator and retail exclusivity rights; combining Sky Racing with Tatts’ retail wagering operations; potential foreclosure  
of competing suppliers of electronic gaming machine systems and services in NSW and Queensland; and reduced competition in the supply of  
electronic gaming machine repair and maintenance services in Victoria
5. Other corporate bookmakers – Sportsbet, Betfair, William Hill, Ladbrokes, Bet365, and Unibet – provided letters in support of CrownBet’s  
Tribunal application
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approach is appropriate because some aspects of 
the phenomenon require interpretation to learn 
about the sense-making process of its participants.53 
As an interpretive analysis, this qualitative approach 
is interventionist research (IVR);54 it deploys theory 
to design and implement a framework, and the 
results are analysed from both a theoretical and 
practical perspective. ‘It is an applied discipline 
owing its existence to practice... IVR has remedial 
potential to address the research-practice-relevance 
gap.’55 As Creswell56 highlights, interpretation in 
qualitative research can take many forms. It can 
be adapted to suit different types of designs and is 
flexible enough to convey ‘personal, research-based, 
and action meanings’.
3.5 Findings
In line with Yin’s57 case study method, the case 
findings were developed by triangulating aspects 
of the literature, theory, and the case evidence to 
improve the credibility of the conclusions. This was 
a non-linear iterative process where the findings 
informed and reinforced each other in a back 
and forth way. Creswell58 suggests working back 
and forth between the themes and the database 
(including interviewing and re-interviewing) until 
propositions are established. 
Converging findings from different sources increases 
construct validity. More than that, Yin59 suggests this 
not only reflects the data but also helps to shape 
the data by sharpening what should be collected 
and analysed, which helps to organise the case 
study. Theoretical propositions stemming from 
‘how’ questions can be beneficial in guiding case 
study analysis. This back and forth is also consistent 
with Eisenhardt and Graebner,60 who suggest 
‘pattern matching’ between theory and data.
4.  THE MERGER BETWEEN TATTS  
AND TABCORP
This section outlines the merger process between 
Tatts and Tabcorp, describing the background to the 
merger, the merging parties, the merger rationale 
and key risks around regulatory hurdles and rival 
bids. The merger took a longer-than-expected  
14 months to close, mainly because of disruptions 
by regulatory issues and competing bids. 
4.1 Background to the merger
In November 2015, Tatts and Tabcorp confirmed 
that talks to agree on terms for a nil-premium 
share-swap merger of equals (MOE) had failed. In 
2016, negotiations resumed, and, in October of that 
year, the merger was announced. The agreement 
came on the back of Tatts’ struggling operating 
performance (S4, S6, S7, F1) and a higher Tabcorp 
share price that enabled Tabcorp to sweeten its 
offer premium (L1, L2). Tabcorp also backed their 
own more robust management, which was well 
regarded (E3, F3).
In addition to engaging with Tabcorp in 2015 about 
a potential MOE, the Tatts board had considered 
numerous business strategies to improve its 
performance. These included: discussions held 
with a rival bidder Pacific Consortium (Pacific); 
considering its strategic landscape and alternatives; 
an assessment of potential cost savings; demerging 
one or more of its businesses or selling assets; and 
maintaining the status quo.61 After weighing these 
alternatives, the Tatts board concluded that  
Tabcorp was the most attractive option.
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Tatts was itself the outcome of a 2006 merger 
between listed Australian gambling groups UNiTAB 
Ltd and Tattersall’s Ltd. At the time of the merger 
announcement, Tatts was an ASX-registered 
provider of gambling services with a $5.3 billion 
market capitalisation and around 2,350 employees 
across its lottery, wagering, and gaming businesses. 
Independent experts valued it at $5.4–5.9 billion.62 
In FY17, Tatts reported revenue of $2.8 billion,  
EBIT of $386 million, racing industry fees of  
$190 million, and lottery and wagering tax  
payments of $1.15 billion to the state government 
and $217 million federally.63 
Tabcorp
At the time of announcing the merger, Tabcorp 
was a gambling entertainment company with $4 
billion market capitalisation. Independent experts 
valued the company at $3.8–4.3 billion.64 Tabcorp 
comprised three core businesses – wagering and 
media, Keno, and gaming services – and employed 
over 3,000 people. In FY17, Tabcorp’s revenue  
was $2.2 billion, and its EBIT was $102 million.  
It paid $406 million in gambling/general sales  
taxes, $46 million in income tax, and returned  
$813 million to the racing industry.65 
4.3 Merger rationale
In justifying the merger, Tabcorp66 highlights three 
‘significant structural changes’ in Australia’s wagering 
industry. These were the technology shift from 
retail sales channels to digital, the model shift from 
totalisator to fixed-odds betting, and the market 
shift from racing to sports. Tabcorp67 identified 
‘substantial synergies’ that would benefit a range 
of stakeholders, such as state racing bodies, retail 
venues, sporting bodies, and governments. Tatts68 
saw the merger as a way to create a larger, more 
efficient company offering improved products  
while reducing costs and increasing revenue.  
These efficiencies would also directly benefit  
the racing industry through existing revenue  
and profit-sharing arrangements.
The independent experts commissioned by  
Tatts found the merger would create a diversified 
gambling entertainment company spanning lotteries, 
betting, and gaming. Additionally, it would net a 
suite of long-dated licences (except in Victoria); a 
more balanced portfolio of businesses; and a depth 
of scale in the capabilities that underpin global 
competition and growth.69 Further, a unified  
TAB brand would provide ‘arguably the best 
opportunity’ to turn around Tatts’ wagering 
business and meet competitive challenges from 
corporate bookmakers.70 This strengthening of the 
company would be underpinned by aligning the 
product offerings, concentrating marketing on a 
single brand, consolidating technology expenditure 
and improving its capacity, better margins as a result 
of synergy benefits, and more robust racing industry 
as a result of increased funding and better products.
4.4 Key risks
Regulatory hurdles
There were conditional regulatory approvals for 
the merger. In March 2017, the ACCC released its 
Statement of Issues (SOI) with one concern and five 
other issues it identified that ‘may raise concern’.71 
To address these issues, Tabcorp committed to 
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and ultimately divested from Odyssey Gaming 
Services (Odyssey), a Queensland poker machines 
monitoring company (aka slot machines, colloquially 
known as ‘pokies’). The ACCC’s concern was that 
the proposed merger was likely to substantially 
lessen competition in Queensland for the supply 
of pokies monitoring, repair, and maintenance 
services by combining Maxgaming and Odyssey 
(subsidiaries of Tatts and Tabcorp respectively). 
Notably, the ACCC’s five potential concerns were 
never satisfied. Four days after the SOI release, the 
merging parties decided to bypass the ACCC and 
applied directly to the Tribunal to authorise the 
proposed merger.
Besides Tatts, three other parties were granted 
leave to intervene in opposition to the transaction 
– CrownBet, Racing.com, and the Victorian racing 
industry (comprising Racing Victoria, Harness Racing 
Victoria, and Greyhound Racing Victoria as joint 
intervenors). Attention was placed on concerns 
surrounding the merger’s impact on the wagering 
market, the racing media, and the sale of exclusive 
state wagering licences.72 
The Tribunal’s legal test is more comprehensive 
than the ACCC’s because it includes a ‘net public 
benefit’ assessment, whereas the ACCC’s test only 
evaluates the risk that a merger will substantially 
reduce competition. Focusing on concerns over 
the merger’s impact on the wagering market, 
the racing media, and the sale of exclusive state 
wagering licences, the Tribunal authorised the 
merger. ‘The benefits to the public... are substantial. 
The detriments identified by the ACCC and the 
interveners are unlikely to either arise or are not 
otherwise material.’ 73 Racing.com and the Racing 
Victoria dropped their case. CrownBet and the 
ACCC separately applied for judicial review of the 
Tribunal’s original authorisation. This application  
was upheld and remitted back to the Tribunal for  
further consideration but ended with approval  
for the merger to proceed.
The ACCC did not apply for further judicial review 
of the Tribunal’s decision,74 and CrownBet dropped 
the threat of taking the Tribunal decision to the full 
Federal Court for a judicial review when it reached 
an agreement with Tabcorp over access to the 
stream vision of Tabcorp’s Sky Racing channel.75 
C1 explains this was ‘very significant’ for its online 
operations and profitability, although concerns 
remained over some advertising restrictions. 
Rival offers
During the merger process, Tatts received and 
rejected rival proposals from Pacific, a consortium 
of financial investors (see Table 2 for the consortium 
members). Despite three efforts by Pacific to 
improve its plan, the Tatts’ board continued to 
recommend Tabcorp’s proposal, deeming Pacific’s 
proposal inferior.76 
With an understanding of the merger background, 
the merging parties, their rationale to merge, and 
the critical regulatory and rival bidder risks around 
the merger, I can now proceed with an analysis of 
Tatts and Tabcorp’s stakeholder management during 
the merger process.
5. ANALYSIS
In this section, I analyse how stakeholder 
management by Tatts and Tabcorp helped to 
overcome significant opposition from powerful 
stakeholders to the merger and ultimately succeed.  
I apply Savage et al.’s typology77 to examine 
how the most potentially disruptive stakeholder 
relationships were managed during the merger 
process, followed by a discussion of the findings.
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5.1  A stakeholder management approach 
from the beginning
Tatts and Tabcorp’s initial plan to managing their 
stakeholder relationships was explained in their 
merger proposal,78 with 5 of the 13 presentation 
pages devoted to the benefits of the merger to 
various stakeholders. These were identified as 
Tatts and Tabcorp’s shareholders, the Australian 
racing industry, business partners, customers, 
and ‘our people’ as stakeholders. Except for ‘our 
people’, each of these stakeholders had one page 
devoted to how they could expect to benefit from 
the merger. Tatts79 counted staff as its internal 
stakeholders and its external stakeholders as 
its investors/shareholders, customers, suppliers/
business partners, government/regulatory agencies, 
industry partners/associations, and the community. 
The day the merger agreement was announced, 
Tatts and Tabcorp launched ‘the mother of all 
charm offensives’ (F2) to entice stakeholders, which 
involved well over 100 meetings with shareholders, 
the racing industry, and other business partners 
(T1, F1, L3). All but one of the interviewees 
(Rac2) were impressed by the effort to overcome 
various stakeholder opposition. All interviewees 
acknowledge the critical role this offensive played in 
getting the merger implemented; none were able 
to cite precedent in the magnitude of the offensive 
in an Australian merger. Tabcorp knew its key 
stakeholders. It had always kept them close, and 
once the merger was announced, Tabcorp did the 
rounds to educate them and make it easier for them 
to understand the transaction (T2). ‘The length 
they went to in anticipating problems and getting 
broad stakeholder support was massive. They tried 
to arrange [it such that] each child had a toy, dealing 
with the self-interests of each stakeholder and 
removing key obstacles’ (E1).
It was also emphasised that Tabcorp’s day-to-
day relationships with its key stakeholders were 
embedded in its corporate culture as ‘just the  
way of doing business’ (L4). Tabcorp, R1 noted, 
operated in a highly regulated market and so 
were well familiar with managing stakeholder 
relationships. ‘It is part of what they do. They 
know their way around.’ C1 describes the scale 
of the charm effort as ‘unprecedented’ despite 
stakeholder management being common practice 
where regulatory concerns loom large. Rac1 said  
it was ‘an enviable strategy that was effective’.  
C1 nevertheless believes Tabcorp could have  
won the support of the intervenors without  
going to the Tribunal. ‘Tabcorp was not flexible 
enough to pivot.’
Tabcorp was seen to have a more robust 
corporate governance record than Tatts (S7), 
which ‘treated stakeholders as a cost compared 
to Tabcorp treating stakeholders as assets – a 
different philosophical approach between the two 
companies. Tatts shared nothing with the racing 
industry. Tabcorp did’ (T2).
Announcing its decision to bypass the ACCC and 
lodge an application with the Tribunal for merger 
authorisation, Tabcorp80 highlighted how it had 
‘actively engaged with stakeholders’. It noted 
that ‘it has become clear that many stakeholders 
are strongly supportive of the transaction and 
its anticipated benefits’. Also, its application will 
be supported by ‘substantive evidence from a 
wide range of industry participants and experts 
as to the substantial public benefits from the 
transaction accruing to the racing industry, venue 
partners, customers, shareholders and the broader 
community’. The application was endorsed by 
witness statements from the racing industry in 
every state/territory, other than Victoria, and 
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representatives from retail wagering venues, peak 
retail bodies, and associations representing jockeys 
and trainers. 
Tabcorp81 argued this stakeholder approach was 
better suited to the Tribunal process, which tests 
the balance of public benefits resulting from the 
proposed transaction against the likely detriments, 
including reduced competition. In contrast, the 
ACCC’s informal merger clearance test is limited 
to assessing whether a proposed acquisition is 
expected to lessen competition substantially; it 
cannot consider countervailing public benefits.
5.2  Stakeholder management during  
the merger
This backdrop of stakeholder management by Tatts 
and Tabcorp during the merger process requires a 
more detailed analysis with a particular focus on the 
most potentially disruptive stakeholder relationships. 
Informed by the case evidence, the discussion 
draws on Savage et al.’s four generic strategies for 
managing four different types of stakeholders82,  
as illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Savage et al.83 categorise stakeholders according 
to their potential to threaten or cooperate with 
an organisation. The four stakeholder types are 
supportive (Type 1), marginal (Type 2), non-
supportive (Type 3) or mixed blessing (Type 4). 
Each type requires different strategies to manage. 
Supportive stakeholders (defined as a low potential 
threat and high potential cooperation) are best 
managed by involvement. Marginal stakeholders 
(neither highly threatening nor especially 
cooperative) are best managed by monitoring. 
Non-supportive stakeholders (high potential threat, 
low potential cooperation) are best managed by 
defensive strategies. Mixed blessing stakeholders 
(equal potential to threaten or cooperate) 
are best managed by collaboration. ‘Managers 
should attempt to satisfy the needs of marginal 
stakeholders minimally and to satisfy maximally 
the needs of supportive and mixed blessing 
stakeholders.’ 84 This section illustrates the different 
stakeholder management strategies during the 
Tatts/Tabcorp merger process using Savage  
et al.’s typology of organisational stakeholders.85 
Element A: Shareholders 
In managing their shareholder relationships, Tatts 
and Tabcorp highlighted86 that the merger would 
benefit shareholders by creating: 1) a more 
diversified national portfolio of gambling licences, 
which would position the group to invest, innovate, 
and compete in an evolving marketplace; 2) 
synergies and business improvements; 3) a stronger 
balance sheet to pursue capital management 
initiatives; 4) a $500m buyback, and 5) a targeted 
dividend payout ratio of 90% of net profits after 
tax. This was ultimately persuasive. Shareholders 
overwhelmingly supported the merger, with 95.6% 
of shareholders voting in favour of the scheme, 
and 98.6% of votes cast in favour.87 Tabcorp 
shareholders never voted. Interviews with both 
companies and Tabcorp shareholders suggest strong 
support for the scheme from Tabcorp shareholders 
(F1, L2, T1, S3).
In the Savage et al.’s typology,88 these shareholders 
were mostly Type 1 stakeholders – either 
supportive (non-threatening, cooperative) and 
involved or marginal (neither threatening nor 
cooperative) and monitored. As shown in  
Table 2, by extensively involving their respective 
shareholders, Tatts and Tabcorp managed to 
contain potential opposition among shareholders to 
small activist shareholders. A Tabcorp institutional 
investor who sold out once the merger was 
announced (S3) highlighted that, even though 
Tabcorp shareholders overwhelmingly supported 
the transaction, his fundamental valuations 
estimated that Tabcorp had paid 15–20% too  
much. He also believed the transaction was too 
difficult to value given the opaque nature of 
disclosure around the benefits.
A few outlier shareholders can be classified as  
Type 2 stakeholders as they presented a low threat 
and required no need for cooperation. Two activist 
shareholders of Tatts, Sandon Capital and Hunter 
Green Institutional Broking (holding well under 
1% in Tatts collectively) called for shareholders to 
reject the merger because the financial benefits 
of the proposed merger were skewed in favour 
of Tabcorp’s shareholders. Sandon Capital89 
calculated that Tatts shareholders would be giving 
away almost $1.5bn in value. Charlie Green, the 
founder of Hunter Green Institutional Broking, 
called for the Tatts’ board to walk away from the 
merger given Tabcorp’s FY17 results diminished 
the value of the merger.90 S1 said their calls never 
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gathered momentum primarily because Tatts’ major 
shareholders were focused on the short-term risk 
of a sharp drop in the Tatts share price should the 
merger fail. He noted only one meeting was held 
with Tatts’ chief executive. ‘There was no point in 
having more meetings.’ 
The shareholder relationships held by both Tatts 
and Tabcorp can be characterised as ‘managerial 
governance’, where ownership rights are mediated 
by institutional investors. In turn, these institutional 
investors leave the strategic and operational control 
of the firm in the hands of salaried executives who 
serve as agents for widely dispersed shareholders.91 
However, these shareholders played no small role 
in influencing management, most notably in pushing 
Tatts towards a merger with Tabcorp. They lent 
Tabcorp crucial support to proceed and supported 
Tatts in rejecting rival approaches from Pacific. 
While the analysis only spans the Tatts/Tabcorp 
merger from announcement to implementation, 
the situation before the merger is instructive for 
stakeholder management. In Savage et al.’s terms,92 
Tatts collaborated with its key shareholders who 
were Type 4 stakeholders, i.e., mixed blessing 
with potential to both threaten and cooperate 
with Tatts. Many interviews (L1, S1, S2, S4, S5, T1) 
reveal that, in the lead up to the merger, Tatts faced 
shareholder pressure to improve its performance 
and renew its strategy, including some consideration 
of demerging its wagering business. They argued 
this was a significant influence in getting Tatts to 
eventually agree on terms with Tabcorp. Tatts’  
2016 annual general meeting saw 22% of its  
shares voted against its remuneration report,93  
the most common proxy for a protest vote (S2). 
Tatts’ two largest shareholders at the time, 
Perpetual and AustralianSuper, signed confidentiality 
agreements and were ‘brought behind the wall’ 
by Tabcorp before the merger announcement 
to show Tatts they had shareholder support and 
to help bring target directors on board (L1, S2, 
S5). AustralianSuper went public with its support 
the day of the merger announcement.94 These 
large shareholders had been actively pushing the 
Tatts board for such a merger on the basis that 
both were losing market share. They cited Tatt’s 
historic slowness to move to digital platforms 
(S8), its synergies, limited other alternatives, 
and the difficulties of demerging its wagering 
business as reasons in favour of the Tabcorp 
merger (S5). There was no engagement with 
other shareholders due to the risk of information 
leaks before the announcement. Involvement with 
other shareholders started the day the merger 
was announced with a joint briefing led by the 
chairpersons of Tatts and Tabcorp, followed 
by extensive shareholder and roadshows. One 
Tabcorp shareholder (S6) said it was apparent  
that the merger would happen; the only question 
related to the merger ratio. A preference for  
not being informed beforehand was expressed  
to avoid binding confidentiality restraints.
Element B: Pacific Consortium
Rival bidder Pacific Consortium is classified as 
a Type 3 stakeholder (non-supportive). Pacific 
disrupted the natural flow of the merger with 
delays, distractions, and by generating shareholder 
pressure on Tatts to engage Pacific through 
altogether three indicative and non-binding 
proposals (L1, S1, S2, S4, S5). Tatts rejected all as 
inferior on the basis that they could not reasonably 
be expected to result in a superior proposal 
when compared to Tabcorp’s. Tatts adopted a 
defensive management approach to this Type 
3 non-supportive) stakeholder and its potential 
to threaten the merger.95 C2 highlights that the 
constraints in Australia, where boards, management, 
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and shareholders unite, prevented any alternative 
action. ‘Pacific could get nowhere, only a handful 
of shareholders reached out to Pacific.’ Pacific’s 
problem was being unable to find a buyer for Tatts’ 
wagering business (S6, L1). Tabcorp was seen as 
‘the natural buyer’ of the whole group (S6, S8), and 
there were also potential capital gains tax leakages 
for shareholders (S8). 
For R1, Pacific saw no point engaging shareholders 
without an agreement with Tatts, which it could not 
get to participate. ‘It never got to that stage. Only 
a few Tatts shareholders reached out.’ For its part, 
Tabcorp was reminding Tatts’ shareholders that 
Tatts did not have a free option to grant Pacific due 
diligence given Tabcorp’s exclusivity agreement with 
Tatts (F1), and it also put the merger timeline at risk. 
‘It was in the Tatts’ shareholders best interests that 
Tatts not engage.’
Element C: The racing industry
Described as a ‘mutually dependent eco-system’ 
(L3), Tabcorp’s relationship with the racing 
industry had to be carefully managed during the 
merger process, starting with significant industry 
engagement immediately after the merger was 
announced (T1, L3, E3). According to Savage et al.,96 
this is an appropriate strategy for managing Type 4 
(mixed blessing) stakeholders with the potential to 
disrupt and threaten the merger. T2 noted that not 
one licencing agreement with any racing body was 
the same, which created different relationships. ‘It 
was a case by case relationship and approach.’ The 
critical exception was the ‘absolutely crucial’ (T1) 
joint venture with Racing Victoria, described as the 
Manchester United of Australian racing (S1). Racing 
Victoria was a non-supportive stakeholder that had 
to be defended against.97 
The racing industry is heavily reliant on Tabcorp as 
‘a core part of the structure of Australian racing 
and the largest financial contributor to the racing 
industry’.98 Through its industry arrangements, 
licences, and taxes, it returned $813m to the racing 
industry in FY17, including $325m to the Victorian 
racing industry and $312m to the NSW racing 
industry. Tatts paid $190m to the racing industry  
in FY17 via product and race information fees.99 
The merging parties also needed support from the 
racing industry for their anticipated complicated 
regulatory process, which was vulnerable to 
opposition from the powerful racing industry lobby 
(L2). There were statements to the Tribunal from 
23 participants in the racing industry, which the 
Tribunal described as ‘overwhelmingly supportive 
of the proposed merger or did not actively oppose 
the proposed merger’.100 The evidence outlined 
how the extra funding would enable the industry 
to increase prize money, retain field sizes, improve 
racing and patron facilities, and improve animal 
welfare programs, all of which would benefit the 
industry as a whole.101 It was noted, however, that 
some racing bodies ‘relied on presentations given by 
Tabcorp propounding the benefits of the proposed 
acquisition, and this may well be the basis of their 
support’.102 
Tatts and Tabcorp identified the benefits of the 
merger to the racing industry103 as an investment 
from a more substantial wagering operator to 
enhance customer experiences. Also identified 
were: at least $50m in additional annual funding for 
the racing industry; a pathway to national pooling 
for pari-mutuel wagering; and more effective 
competition for the supply of wagering products 
and services. The Tribunal found the greater scale 
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and lower costs would enable the merged group 
to compete more effectively than as individual 
companies. ‘As such, there will likely be greater 
competition than without the merger, particularly  
in online wagering, something that would add to  
the public benefits which would accrue to the  
racing industry and consumers.’104 
As highlighted in Element C of Table 2, all state 
racing peak bodies are classified as Type 4 
stakeholders (mixed blessing), except for Victoria, 
and all, except Victoria, eventually supported the 
merger.105 In the cases of Racing Queensland and 
Racing and Wagering Western Australia (RWWA), 
acceptance came after they negotiated agreements 
with Tabcorp designed to protect their interests. 
Widespread racing industry support for the merger 
was largely based on higher funding, increased 
competition and revenue in the wagering market, 
and the benefits of a national tote.106 
The Victorian racing industry, a Type 3 (non-
supportive) stakeholder, argued the merger would 
lead to a vertically integrated entity with increased 
market power when bidding for racing media rights. 
It would also reduce competition for the exclusive 
Victorian wagering licence, thus lowering returns 
to the racing industry.107 While Racing Victoria was 
expected to oppose the proposed merger, its level 
of aggression and vigorous pursuit surprised the 
merging parties (L1). Historically, relations between 
Tabcorp and Racing Victoria, which wanted to 
leverage its position as the premier racing state,  
had been frosty (E2, L1, S5, C1) – for example, 
Tabcorp’s blackout of Victorian racing vision in 
2015.108 Racing Victoria sensed that their ‘joint 
venture is not joint in the traditional sense where 
each party contributes to strategy but a forced 
marriage under the government’s licensing 
framework. It is a funding and distribution 
agreement whereby Racing Victoria is reliant on 
Tabcorp for money. Tabcorp’s expansion disrupted 
the relationship by introducing conflicts of interest 
around competing businesses’ (Rac2). 
Racing Victoria had a long history of opposing 
Tabcorp, including opposing Tabcorp’s proposed 
merger with UNiTAB in 2006 (L1). T2 noted that 
both Tabcorp and Racing Victoria like to dominate 
and control. ‘The relationship was always tense but, 
in the end, it was commercial despite the tensions.’ 
There was also a sense that Racing Victoria did not 
oppose the merger on principle, but rather to retain 
power (T2) and extract more leverage around 
its upcoming 2024 licence renewal, which ‘quickly 
became transparent’ (L3). ‘Racing Victoria faced 
the biggest risk due to the short-term nature of its 
licence coming up for renewal. It tried to engage 
with Tabcorp but [was] dismissed. It could never 
match their legal challenge at the Tribunal’ (Rac2). 
Racing Victoria has also historically clashed with 
Australia’s second largest racing operator Racing 
NSW (T2, C1, Rac1, Rac2), which has long been 
perceived as ‘tied to the hips’ of Tabcorp (A1). 
‘Racing Victoria was not the highest order of 
business for Tabcorp, which earned more from 
NSW [and] wants to challenge the incumbency of 
Racing Victoria as Australia’s premium racing event 
provider’ (Rac2). Racing NSW was supportive 
of the merger as it would increase wagering 
competition, which, in turn, would benefit the  
NSW racing industry.109 
Racing Queensland’s initial concerns about 
the merger were around a reduced focus on 
Queensland with a shift from being the most 
prominent racing state under Tatts’ UBET to being 
one that was less commercially significant to the 
combined entity. Discussions with Tabcorp led to  
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a confidential commercial arrangement that 
resolved Racing Queensland’s concerns. Racing 
Queensland’s eventual support for the merger 
was premised on better returns given Tabcorp’s 
stronger business when compared to Tatts, 
technology investments, and success in managing 
its yield on its fixed-odds book and TAB brand in 
the retail channel.110 Racing Queensland also saw 
the funding benefits, plus a potential pathway to 
national totalisator pooling, concluding the merger 
would be ‘meaningfully beneficial overall to Racing 
Queensland’.111 Victoria’s joint venture partnership 
with Tabcorp made it easier to play catch up with  
a new offer to Racing Queensland (L3).
RWWA, a public body corporate with the only 
licence to provide pari-mutuel services in Western 
Australia, had initial concerns about whether the 
merger would reduce the commercial attractiveness 
of Tabcorp continuing to pool with RWWA, 
given that the current Tabcorp/RWWA pooling 
agreement expires in 2024.112 Also, RWWA was 
reliant on the intellectual property rights in the TAB 
brand. And, as with the other states, removing one 
potential bidder (Tatts) could reduce competition 
for the WA TAB wagering licence. Discussions 
with Tabcorp led to a confidential agreement 
that provided RWWA ‘with a sufficient degree 
of certainty’ over these concerns. Subsequently, 
RWWA concluded that the merger was ‘broadly 
positive for the Australian wagering and racing 
industry and in particular for the racing industry and 
punters in current Tatts states and territories such 
as Queensland and South Australia’.113 Compared 
to the agreement with Racing Queensland, which 
only involved money and investment, RWWA won 
assurances around a single pool when it privatised 
(T2). For its part, Tabcorp provided no funding 
to RWWA to secure any advantage over future 
privatisation (T2).
Element D: Regulators
The merger was conditional on around 30 regulatory 
approvals (L2, L4), some more disruptive than 
others. All these regulators had to be managed  
but the focus, as highlighted in Table 2, was on the 
ACCC and the Tribunal. Both are Type 4 (mixed 
blessing) stakeholders with the potential to either 
threaten or cooperate with the merger. The 
Tribunal wielded absolute power to determine if  
the merger was in the net public interest and thus 
could proceed. Typically, the ACCC is the final 
arbiter of Australian mergers. If it determines that 
anti-competitive aspects of a merger proposal 
cannot be satisfactorily resolved through 
undertakings or restructuring the merger, the 
project collapses. There are legal avenues for  
the parties to appeal an ACCC final decision,  
but these are not commonly pursued. 
The ACCC was surprised by the parties going to 
the Tribunal but, with hindsight, the ACCC saw 
Tatts and Tabcorp had started making contingencies 
for such a move well before the ACCC’s SOI, 
including lining up evidence and witnesses (R1). 
‘They did a lot of work and lobbying.’ The merging 
parties ‘expected the ACCC to have negative  
views on the merger proposal and were far more 
confident of authorisation based on stronger  
public benefit grounds’ (L1). L3 added that it is  
‘all very well having a sound competition process 
and legal arguments lined up’, but strong 
stakeholder support upfront was critical. ‘It was 
striking how quickly key stakeholders fell behind  
the merger with the exception of Victoria.’  
There were also costs associated with going to  
the Tribunal, not least providing a platform that 
intervenors would not otherwise have had (C1).
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Adopting a collaborative approach to these Type 4 
(mixed blessing) stakeholders,114 Tatts and Tabcorp 
poured enormous resources and effort into the 
Tribunal process. The proceedings were probably 
Australia’s most substantial merger clearance 
authorisation process, with over 1,900 documents 
comprising over 44,000 pages put before the 
Tribunal.115 In total, around 82 statements from 
69 lay witnesses, an additional 15 third party 
submissions, and 12 expert reports from 7 different 
economists were filed in the proceedings.116  
The Tribunal lists 84 witnesses and interested  
third parties.117 
The merging parties acutely understood and 
meticulously went about preparing the merger 
case to satisfy the concerns of the Tribunal were 
they to short-circuit the ACCC – this is a point on 
which all interviewees agreed. These preparations 
involved not least rallying expert opinions and 
stakeholder support immediately after the merger 
was announced from well over 100 meetings with 
shareholders, the racing industry, and other business 
partners (T1, F1, L3). The ACCC’s concern around 
Odyssey was satisfied, but the five different issues 
it identified that ‘may raise concern’ were not. 
Once the merging parties assessed their prospects 
for regulatory approval were more likely to come 
from the Tribunal, they abruptly ended their 
conversations with the ACCC. The ACCC was 
left as an opposer of the merger whose remaining 
concerns did not prevail with the Tribunal.
In addition to offering to divest from Odyssey, 
Tabcorp on its volition submitted conditions to the 
Tribunal. ‘No doubt, mindful of the Tribunal’s earlier 
suggestion that it would prefer to rely on conditions 
as expressed by participants’,118 these conditions 
related to: the supply of Sky Racing to the providers 
of retail channel wagering; the supply of pooling 
services to the RWWA; and any future rival  
pari-mutuel wagering operator in Victoria. Tabcorp 
also committed to dispute resolution mechanisms 
and compliance reporting.
Element E: Competitors
Corporate bookmakers and Racing.com are Type 
4 (non-supportive) and Type 3 (mixed blessing) 
stakeholders, respectively. Tatts and Tabcorp 
successfully defended against them. There was 
a different outcome for CrownBet with whom 
Tabcorp collaborated to negotiate a commercial 
agreement. CrownBet,119 which led the corporate 
bookmaker opposition in the Tribunal process, was 
concerned about the merged entity’s bargaining 
power to acquire racing media rights, especially 
digital media rights. There was also the issue of the 
reduced bargaining power left to the racing media 
suppliers. It was felt the merger would make those 
suppliers more likely to sell their media rights to 
the merged entity than the bookmakers. Access 
to racing media content is a crucial component 
of providing wagering services and is where 
bookmakers would face direct competition with the 
merged entity. Hence, any threat to media access 
was an immediate threat to business operations. 
As shown in Table 2, Racing.com dropped its 
Tribunal intervention. CrownBet persisted longer, 
threatening to appeal the Tribunal’s decision before 
reaching an agreement with Tabcorp over its Sky 
Racing coverage, which was ‘very significant’ for its 
online operations and profitability (C1). CrownBet 
remained concerned, however, about advertising 
restrictions (C1). 
Element F: Advisors
Financial and legal advisors were contracted and 
paid by Tatts and Tabcorp to provide advice and  
act in the interests of the respective boards. These 
are paragon Type 1 (supportive) stakeholders.  
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They were low threat and highly cooperative 
throughout the merger process. All interviewees 
agreed these advisors were a core component  
of stakeholder management during the process. 
Sitting in the decision-making ‘engine room’ of  
both Tatts and Tabcorp, they significantly influenced 
the strategies and tactics used throughout the 
merger process and extensively engaged other 
stakeholders, most notably shareholders, the  
racing industry, and the regulators.
The financial advisors fronted shareholders and 
the racing industry in explaining/defending the 
transaction throughout the process (T1, F2).  
They were heavily involved in strategising and 
negotiating commercial terms with CrownBet.  
They were also involved with the Pacific bid,  
helping to assess the proposal and devise Tatts’ 
responses. Towards the end of the merger process, 
the financial advisors were also responsible for 
corralling shareholder votes. 
In addition to providing legal advice around the 
merger terms, the legal advisors further devised 
and led the legal strategies to win support from 
the Tribunal and, initially, the ACCC. Specialist 
competition and commercial litigation lawyers 
not only faced the Tribunal but provided advice, 
strategy, coordinated statements, and witnesses  
in building the case.
In developing the framework of stakeholder 
relationships during the Tatts/Tabcorp merger 
process shown in Table 2, this analysis reveals 
the approaches taken by Tatts and Tabcorp to 
stakeholder management. Their management of  
six stakeholder relationships during the merger 
process is explained by applying the documentary 
and interview evidence to Savage et al.’s typology120  
for identifying a stakeholder’s potential to threaten 
an organisation. 
6. DISCUSSIONS 
The evidence presented in Section 5 reflects 
the complex social, economic, and political 
consequences arising from the Tatts/Tabcorp 
merger process and the disruptions to numerous 
stakeholder relationships. By drawing out 
the implicit dynamics with these stakeholder 
relationships, a hermeneutic approach helps us 
to understand this complexity. The case evidence 
suggests different stakeholders played diverse, 
changing, and often conflicting roles throughout  
a merger process that both affected the outcome 
of the merger and was affected by the result. The 
Tatts/Tabcorp merger process was a hermeneutic 
web where the parts and the whole could not exist 
without each other. Like the threads of a network, 
the stakeholder relationships were enmeshed, 
mutually dependent, and dialectally imbalanced.
A merger induces varied responses to and from 
stakeholders, each having different interests 
and levels of power in the organisation. As 
Lamberg et al. state,121 such idiosyncrasies mean 
‘understanding the nature of an organisation’s 
environment, constituted by a set of stakeholders 
with acknowledged rights, obligations, interests 
and power, becomes a critical precondition 
for successful managerial decision-making’. 
Furthermore, stakeholder relationships evolve  
and constitute different episodes to the merger 
process that can be understood as both ethical  
and strategic, whose different interests become 
justified concerning the merger process.122 These 
findings were borne out in the Tatts/Tabcorp 
merger, where managing potentially deal breaking 
stakeholder relationships was crucial to the  
merger’s approval.
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6.1  Balancing and disempowering  
stakeholder interests
The stakeholder model contends that stakeholder 
interests should be balanced. Balance, in this 
context, is understood as managing a process and 
consideration in decision making rather than 
distributing financial outputs.123 Reynolds, Schultz 
and Hekman124 explain that balancing stakeholder 
interests is a ‘process of assessing, weighing and 
addressing the competing claims of those who  
have a stake in the actions of the organization’.  
This balancing process, they add, ultimately  
‘includes behaviours that bring some kind of 
resolution to conflicting stakeholder needs or 
requests’. It is a critical stakeholder principle  
‘as it represents the principal mechanism by which 
managers “pay attention to”, elicit, and maintain the 
support of stakeholders with disparate needs and 
wants’. Stakeholder theory does not give primacy  
to one stakeholder over another, ‘though there  
will surely be times when one group will benefit  
at the expense of others. In general, however, 
management must keep the relationships among 
stakeholders in balance’.125 
It cannot be argued that stakeholder interests 
can always be made to align.126 Non-supportive 
stakeholders are defended by reducing the 
dependencies that form the basis of their interest.127 
Managing this is often done by allowing some key 
stakeholder relationships to override and weaken 
others, and even powerful stakeholders are not 
immune to being disempowered.
During the merger process, Tatts and Tabcorp 
adopted both approaches to stakeholder 
management. Some stakeholder interests  
were balanced; others were disempowered.  
The strategies used for each relationship are 
detailed next.
Shareholders: The merger was conditional on Tatts 
obtaining the support of 75% of the voting shares. 
The merger was approved by a massive majority, 
demonstrating that stakeholder management 
to balance shareholder interests was effective. 
Before the merger was agreed to, Tatts was under 
shareholder pressure to renew its performance and 
strategy. Such pressure played no small role in Tatts 
accepting merger terms with Tabcorp. Tabcorp 
faced weaker shareholder opposition, which was 
largely around its claimed synergy benefit claims. 
Tabcorp, too, was ultimately successful in managing 
such concerns, and ended up securing the support 
of its shareholders for the merger even though no 
vote was required.
Pacific Consortium: Tatts rendered Pacific’s 
hostile approaches ineffective from the start. The 
consortium comprised what was considered to be 
credible, serious, and powerful parties. However, 
Tatts was still able to withstand activist shareholder 
pressure to engage with Pacific primarily by 
regaining shareholder confidence after negotiating  
a merger with Tabcorp. Despite a monumental 
effort, Pacific was never able to attract support 
from Tatts’ shareholders. Therefore, it had no way 
to pressure Tatts to engage with its proposal (R1).  
The only support for the Pacific proposal came 
from a few minority activists (Sandon Capital and 
Charlie Green), which were easy for Tatts to fend 
off, given their small size. 
The racing industry: While the merger was not 
conditional on racing industry support, the merged 
groups and the racing industry share a ‘mutually 
dependent eco-system’ that meant racing industry 
support was essential (E3). Such assistance was also 
critical for the parties to persuade shareholders 
and the Tribunal on the merits of the merger and 
weaken intervenor opposition. Management of 
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relationships with the racing industry – not least 
funding – made the benefits clear to the racing 
industry (L3). Such effective management was 
born out of the historical and mutually dependent 
relationship between Tabcorp and the racing 
industry. Where those historic relationships were 
weaker – notably between Tabcorp and RWWA 
and Racing Queensland – the parties were able 
to negotiate their conflicting interests (L3, T1). 
The outlier was Racing Victoria, where the power 
struggle between Victorian racing interests and 
Tabcorp/Tatts was not resolved. Instead, Victoria 
was forced to accept the Tribunal’s findings that 
Victoria’s conditions were unreasonable.
Overcoming concerns from RWWA and Racing 
Queensland through commercial ‘peace’ deals 
with Tabcorp and securing the support of the 
NSW racing industry allowed the parties to 
‘bypass’ Victorian racing interests. This threatened 
the dominance which Racing Victoria wanted to 
leverage (L3, F2, T2). Left isolated as the racing 
industry’s only remaining objector, Racing Victoria 
was surprised at the ease with which RWWA 
reached an agreement with Tabcorp (Rac2). ‘They 
did well in rejecting and isolating Racing Victoria’ 
(E1), but ‘this left resentment within Racing Victoria 
which leaves trust difficult to restore’ (Rac2). 
Regulators: The merger was also conditional on 
regulatory approvals. Management’s regulatory 
focus, as seen in the evidence, was on the ACCC 
and the Tribunal. While the ACCC forced the 
sale of Odyssey, it was outmanoeuvred and 
disempowered in the legal process when Tabcorp 
appealed to the Tribunal directly and, thus, became 
subjected to a different test. At the Tribunal, 
Tabcorp overwhelmed the intervenors by pouring 
massive resources into the legal case and preparing 
from the time the merger was announced in 
anticipation of circumventing the ACCC (L1, L3, E3, 
Reg1, Tab1). This included lining up expert witnesses 
and submitting its motions to satisfy the Tribunal’s 
potential concerns. 
Competitors: CrownBet made extensive use of 
the Tribunal process as an intervenor, a mobiliser 
of other bookmaker opposition, and an appealer, 
before eventually navigating the process to reach 
favourable commercial terms with Tabcorp. 
CrownBet was the only competitor whose  
concerns were balanced. Tabcorp ignored the  
other competitors’ concerns and disempowered 
Racing.com in particular.
Advisors: While there are conflicts around fees, 
the nature of the advisory relationship is one of 
trust and, hence, balance. Advisors were paid 
to act in the interests of the respective boards. 
Beyond robust discussions and strategising, there 
is no evidence to suggest such relationships were 
unbalanced or materially conflicted during the 
merger process. Interests between advisors and  
the boards were mainly aligned, and so required 
little balancing.
6.2 Inter-group stakeholder relationships
Stakeholder theory is about managing potential 
conflicts stemming from diverging interests.128  
Firms do not respond to each stakeholder 
separately but rather to the simultaneous demands 
of multiple stakeholders.129 Cording et al.130 refer  
to the concept of generalised exchange as an 
essential assumption in stakeholder theory,  
whereby a firm’s relationship with one stakeholder 
influences its relationships with other stakeholders. 
During the Tatts/Tabcorp merger process,  
balancing stakeholder disruptions also required 
managing conflicting inter-group stakeholder 
interests. I consider a few of these interests in  
the next sections.
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Shareholders and racing industry: During the 
merger process, the conflicting interests of 
shareholders and the racing industry had to be 
managed. ‘Tabcorp pitched the synergy number at a 
sufficient level to appease shareholders and yet not 
alienate the racing industry and regulators. It was a 
stakeholder balancing act’ (S4). E1 and E3 likened 
the balancing act to one of trying to ensure that 
every child has a toy. S4 and S8 highlighted tensions 
around pitching sufficiently attractive synergy 
numbers to appease shareholders without alienating 
the racing industry. ‘Tabcorp knew it needed to 
share the spoils; shareholders accepted this to  
get the merger done’ (E3).
Shareholders and Pacific: Management of Tatts 
shareholders helped ensure that the only support 
for Pacific’s rival proposal came from a few minority 
activist shareholders. Despite their best efforts, 
Pacific was never able to attract much support  
from Tatts’ shareholders and, thus, no pressure  
built on Tatts to engage with Pacific (R1). 
Racing industry and regulators: By extensively 
nurturing and negotiating commercial agreements 
in the cases of Racing Queensland and RWWA, 
the merging parties managed much of the racing 
industry support for the merger that was provided 
as crucial evidence to both the ACCC and Tribunal. 
Furthermore, opposition from Racing Victoria was a 
key instigator in Tabcorp using the Tribunal process 
(E2, Rac2).
6.3 Intra-group stakeholder relationships
Stakeholders are not monolithic, homogeneous 
groups; instead, they differ widely in terms 
of interests, involvement, sophistication, and 
their capacity to influence.131 By exploring large 
stakeholder groups, researchers ignore many 
differences within groups.132 Lamberg et al.133 
argue that M&A research offers opportunities to 
re-examine existing frameworks and to develop 
more dynamic and realistic understandings of what 
happens within and between stakeholder ‘networks’ 
to influence organisational actions and outcomes. 
Evidence from the Tatts/Tabcorp merger process 
reveals that their stakeholders are not homogenous 
but a complex mixture of differing and conflicting 
interests in the merger. These intra-group 
stakeholder interests had to be managed. 
Shareholders: Managing the divergent interests 
among shareholders was important to securing 
shareholder support for the merger. Valuations  
and investment motivations differed between  
the activists, those invested in both Tatts and 
Tabcorp, the long-term shareholders, and the  
retail investors. At the time, Tabcorp itself was  
a substantial shareholder in Tatts with a 9.99%  
stake, so Tabcorp was also protecting its interests, 
and these interests were not necessarily the same 
as the other Tatts shareholders. A bidding war  
with Pacific, for example, would have benefitted 
almost everyone other than Tabcorp. Against  
the interests of institutional and retail investors,  
as evidenced by their votes for the merger, the  
small activist Tatts shareholders provided the  
sole shareholder opposition.
Racing industry: Intra-group stakeholder dynamics 
in the racing industry were also managed. Balancing 
the initial concerns from RWWA and Queensland 
racing interests through negotiated agreements  
was crucial to disempowering the most potent 
industry player Racing Victoria. Racing Victoria  
was surprised at the ease with which RWWA,  
in particular, reached an agreement with Tabcorp 
(Rac2). Securing the support of the NSW racing 
industry, perceived as historically ‘tied to the  
hips’ of Tabcorp (A1), along with its well-known 
clashes with Racing Victoria (T2, C1, Rac2), further 
allowed the parties to bypass Victorian racing 
interests and threaten the dominance it wanted  
to leverage (L3, F2). 
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Regulators: Tabcorp weakened the ACCC by 
circumventing its merger review process with a 
direct appeal to the Tribunal and playing off their 
different roles. The Tribunal applies a net public 
benefit assessment, whereas the ACCC assesses 
the risk of substantially lessening competition. 
As such, these regulators arrived at different 
conclusions. The ACCC intervened to challenge  
the Tribunal’s decision, but never agreed with  
the final ruling.
Competitors: Tabcorp negotiated a deal with 
CrownBet that gave it significant advantages over 
other rival corporate bookmakers, even though 
they supported CrownBet’s Tribunal application. 
By reaching an agreement with CrownBet, Tabcorp 
also weakened Racing.com’s intervention at the 
Tribunal. Tabcorp was well aware that CrownBet 
was the most aggressive of the corporate 
bookmakers because of its unprofitability and small 
scale. Hence, CrownBet was under pressure to 
find a game changer. It needed scale and acquiring 
Tabcorp’s vision rights gave it just that (C3).
What emerges from the evidence is that managing 
stakeholders involves both balancing and 
disempowering vital stakeholder interests during 
the merger process. Tatts and Tabcorp balanced 
most of their key stakeholder relationships, 
including conflicting inter- and intra-group 
stakeholder interests and, in doing so, they were 
able to disempower the most potentially disruptive 
stakeholder relationships – most notably, Pacific,  
the ACCC, and Racing Victoria.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In considering how Tatts and Tabcorp’s stakeholder 
management was affected by, and how it affected, 
its merger process, I have viewed Tatts and 
Tabcorp’s stakeholder management in hermeneutic 
terms as a dynamic process of the whole (the 
merger process) and its parts (the stakeholder 
relationships) coming together through stakeholder 
management. The case evidence suggests that 
managing these stakeholder relationships during 
their merger process was far from static and 
smooth, but a process was ebbing and flowing 
through phases of disruption and interruption by 
multiple stakeholder relationships. This involved 
both accommodating and disempowering 
stakeholder interests. Balancing some stakeholder 
interests allowed the parties to weaken and 
ignore the concerns of other stakeholders. 
With substantial risks around the regulators, 
shareholders, the racing industry, and competitors, 
the merger could have fallen over. However, Tatts 
and Tabcorp’s management of the potentially 
disruptive stakeholder relationships was crucial  
to see it go through.
This paper paves the way for future research  
to investigate the multidirectional and dynamic, 
intra- and inter-group relationships between 
stakeholders that are characterised by a complex 
web of relationships between a merger process  
and its stakeholder parts. It is apparent that, while 
the merger affected stakeholder relationships,  
it was in no small part influenced by those very 
same relationships. The paper facilitates historical 
analysis, forward assessment, future planning and 
proactive responding, both for academics in devising 
theories and explanations and for practitioners  
in considering, designing, and implementing  
M&A strategies.
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Burt (RWWA CEO) Statement to the Australian Competition Tribunal
Sandon Capital Tatts Group: Vote AGAINST the Scheme Resolution
Forbes (Racing Queensland CEO) Statement to the Australian Competition Tribunal
Tatts/Tabcorp Merger Implementation Deed
Tatts/Tabcorp Recommended combination of Tabcorp Holdings and Tatts Group Limited
Tatts/Tabcorp
Tabcorp and Tatts to combine to create a world-class diversified gambling 
entertainment group
Tabcorp Application to the Australian Competition Tribunal for Merger Authorisation
Tabcorp Tabcorp Annual Report 2017
Tabcorp Tabcorp enters into agreements with CrownBet
Tabcorp Tabcorp to seek authorisation from the Australian Competition Tribunal
Tatts Results of 2016 Annual General Meeting
Tatts Pacific Consortium Revised Proposal not Superior
Tatts Tatts’ Outline of Opening Submissions
Tatts Tatts Group Limited Annual Report 2017
Tatts Tatts Group Limited Scheme Booklet
Tribunal Decision on Tabcorp merger
Tyshing (CrownBet COO) Statement to the Australian Competition Tribunal
V'Landys (Racing NSW CEO) Statement to the Australian Competition Tribunal
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